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Tuesday 11 September 2012 - 08:39

Once upon a time, America stopped a Middle East war

Story Code : 194564
Once upon a time, America stopped a Middle East war
That was something that people everywhere would want. So what happened? Why was it not realized after all the huge amounts expended on Cold War military budgets when the threat no longer existed?

Did some 'special interests' see the diversion of large defense expenditures into peaceful ones as a threat to their continued accumulation of wealth? While various country and ideological conflicts get 98% of the news coverage, we think that very old international criminal networks are the ones who love war the most.

It's an old game, but one being played now with new high tech tools like derivatives trading which has become the thermonuclear financial weapon that destroys indiscriminately.

Why? Because countries historically have given these criminal networks a free pass to do whatever they want with immunity from prosecution as long as they help them in Cold War conflicts. So why would such criminal networks not prefer eternal warfare?

    They loved the Cold War. When it ended the race was on to find a new threat to keep fleecing the taxpayers of so many countries with manufactured threats. And thus the modern charade of the War on Terror was born, a terror that is 85 to 90% manufactured by western nations working closely, either knowingly or unknowingly, with these multinational criminal networks.


One of the Cold War gold stars goes to America during the Suez War. Eisenhower and Allen Dulles, not perfect men by any measure, they did the right thing for America and the Allies involved. They stood up to the Lobby pressure of this criminal network, with big dreams in its head of a safe haven country, nuclear weapons, diplomatic immunity and all the other goodies that go with controlling a pirate base. Unfortunately they eventually got all that anyway.

I had an intimate peek behind the curtain into the Suez War showdown through an extensive interview with author Kennet Love, who was, I believe, the last non-Jewish New York Times correspondent back in the days when they covered the whole Mideast.

Kennet's one major book for history was Suez: The Twice Fought War, an 1100-page tome where I used up one entire yellow highlighter because there were so many key quotes in it. One of my early Internet strokes of luck was to meet a Palestinian activist who actually lived near him on Long Island, N.Y. I quickly teamed up with Marjorie to organize a two day interview.

Why? Because the New York Times correspondent in those days got lots of face time with all the heads of state who wanted that media exposure. Kennet interviewed them all, became a close confidant to Nasser, and was even used by several to pass personal messages to other heads of state. You can't get more intimate than that as a journalist.

In reviewing my interview preparation notes toady, I found this first question I chose. It was a timeless quote in the book's preface: “The Suez Crisis taught us that democratic leaders can be just as dangerously wrong as dictators when they act in secret on secret information...An ignorant or prejudiced public offers no protection.” I chose it because we have exactly the same problem today, either having learned nothing since then, or...someone's wanting the game to remain the same.

Sometimes heads of state will try to use journalists to transmit psyops information. Another interview question was, “On September 25th, 1954, Ben-Gurion told you in an interview that he would open the Gulf of Aqaba within a year, and by force if necessary. Why do you think he disclosed this to you?” It takes a very savvy and disciplined journalist to smell when something just isn't right. And no, they do not teach this in the college.

    The post WWII Mideast found itself in literally an orgy of diplomatic intrigue. Financially devastated, France and England were desperately trying to hang onto any overseas concessions they could milk to restore prostrate economies at home. Domestic communist parties were nipping at their heels. The former colonies, of course, saw their opportunity for independence and were going for it full steam.


Mr. Love described how Nasser wanted to avoid picking sides in the Cold War as that would hurt him domestically by labeling him a foreign puppet delivering Egypt to a new master. He turned down the offered U.S military aid with a counter request for roads, schools, and hospitals which his people needed much more than arms.

It would have been a win-win situation for all. But Allen Dulles could not see any value in an ally that would not be anti-Soviet. The policy folly of ‘Either you are for us or against us' was really imprinted on our post WWII leadership.

Israel's 1950 slaughter of the Azama Beduins in Gaza forced Nasser to ditch the humanitarian aid for military to defend Egypt. Without it, he faced continued humiliation. Israel would of course paint Egypt as a bigger threat. We see the modern version of this being played out with the hyped Iran threat despite its long history of not invading anyone.

Later when the U.S. began backing off its proffered support for the Aswam dam, after Nasser had already bet his political farm on it, he really had no choice but to nationalize the Suez Canal early to provide the needed revenues to close the deal with the Soviets. Dulles mistakenly did not believe the Soviets could actually fund the deal, the classic mistake of substituting prejudice for judgment.

But the British and French did not care. They finally had their casus belli to go into Egypt. Nasser's support for the Algerian rebels had the French in a rage and the Brits wanted a popular, short, 'take the canal' back war for the domestic prestige. Ben Gurion and Israeli Intel played them all.

The three-party Suez attack went ahead, a way too complicated story to cover now. But Eisenhower and Dulles were quick to condemn the attack despite the Soviets marching through Hungary and Britain still not in NATO yet. America joined the Soviet block in the UN to call for a cease-fire and withdrawal, and the shock waves rolled out.

Although the British and French accepted the UN turn of the cards, Ben Gurion was determined to play a game of chicken with Gaza, refusing to withdraw. As always, the Jewish Lobby was unleashed on Congress to pummel Eisenhower to back off his full withdrawal demands, but he stuck to his guns.

Dulles was bitter with the Lobby. “The Israeli Embassy is practically dictating to the Congress through influential Jewish people in the country...I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews, but I am going to have one...I believe in what George Washington said in his Farewell Address that an emotional attachment to another country should not interfere.”

Eisenhower raised the ante on the Jewish Lobby pressure by telling Ben-Gurion he would call for sanctions against Israel and eliminate all the tax deductions for Israeli raising funding in American. Ike went on national TV, took the Lobby on in public, and whipped their butts.

Faced with the looming UN sanctions vote, the Israelis pulled out of Gaza, but only after destroying the infrastructure, sowing more bitter seeds for continuing the conflict. We know from our declassified intelligence in Stephen Green's Taking Sides expose, that they had every intention of doing so.

And here we are, September, 2012. Our media interviews over the past few weeks with former National Security Council MidEast desk officer Gwenth Todd disclosed that she had broken up the NeoCon and rogue Navy officer false flag attack in Bahrain in December of 2007.

A large number of American servicemen would have been killed and then blamed on Iran supported Shias. That was the set up. The attack on Iran would have been a done deal, and we would all be paying for it dearly now.

That is something to think about over the next two months heading into the elections here. We still have work to do to see to it that those who were guilty of this crime, pay for it, no matter who or where they are.
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