The Third Intifada, a national interest or an Israeli Trap!

The political situation has witnessed since the beginning of the contemporary Palestinian revolution several decisive battles and distinguished historical turns as well as setbacks and reversals, where some of them reached the level of defeat starting from September in Jordan, passing through the civil war in Lebanon and its occupation in 1982, and ending with the Oslo Agreement and the two blessed uprisings of the Palestinian people before and after it. Yet, where is the political audit? 

All the revolutions of the peoples on earth made the audit a habit, but we did not do so? Why? Is it because of the lack of the Palestinian political thought? Or because of other rationales, considerations and implications, (in my viewpoint, no matter how great their value was) they are still unacceptable system at both the practical and struggle related levels! 
Under the current status of the Middle East, the Palestinians are facing unique moments that were probably not been available to them earlier and they require reviewing the concepts and methods of their work and reconsidering the order of their situation and their tools to become suitable with the conditions of the climates and atmospheres that were brought by the cases of the popular and protest movements i.e. the new balances in the region. 

Despite all this, the needed and necessary reviews did not take place, and this explains why do some continue their dependency on a specific and a particular political option and kept standing still behind it for several decades, although the words of life and experience have confirmed more than once its invalidity. 

Maybe we did not need this introduction, if the subject that we want to discuss was not this important. In fact, different Palestinian media spread conversations, statements, articles, and/or opinions talk about a near explosion of a third Palestinian Intifada, as well as some Arab and international media mentioned the same thing this way, or that. Also, we will not miss to note that the enemy media is the first one to speak about the third intifada and its expected prospects. 

It is interesting that whenever anyone talk or every time (Israel) spread a certain atmosphere and climates that warn of hot Palestinian winds (violence, terrorism, uprising, as claimed by Israel), we feel as if particular Palestinian circles are preparing to respond and are taking by their selves the task of rejecting any Palestinian uprising yet to come completely, and some rush to say as well “We will not allow it to happen”, and this does not serve a Palestinian interest. On the other hand, we find those who are enthusiastic and are foreseeing it, stressing that the conditions in the West Bank specifically have become unbearable and intolerable, and that the only response to this is to torch the third intifada. 
Given the debates and varying estimates regarding whether there are benefits from this or not, a series of questions emerge in the following form: 

1-    Are the elements of the third intifada available, and are the Palestinians actually able to launch it? 

2-    Would this Intifada in the said time and place have any combative addition, or it is but only an Israeli trap? 

3-    Are those who are promoting this, all the parties (including Israel), carrying out a political propaganda and nothing more or less? Is this just a paper for political blackmail and media hype? 

4-    Are the Palestinians really in need of a third Intifada, and is it possible to launch an uprising despite the split? 

5-    Would the Intifada include all the occupied Palestine, including the 1948 lands, or it will be limited to the West Bank only, and how would Gaza participate and it is not being occupied? 

6-    Why the Palestinians did not draw lessons based on the previous uprisings? 
Why the Palestinian political thought despite the passage of many years did not find solutions to the problems, dilemmas, shortcomings, setbacks caused primarily by the bad political utilization of the first Intifada, and the worn role of the political leadership in the second Intifada. The transparency, proficiency, and objectivity require revealing explicitly “that the theorists of the coming uprising did not provide facts, particulars, and data that lead us actually to be convinced that it is inevitable and the most prominent thing it that they were clearly wishing it to happen even if the backgrounds of their desires were good aiming at deepening the intensification of the conflict with the occupiers. 

The case of controversy and rhetoric about the need for and the possibility of breaking a third intifada put us in front of a question: Did the theory of the uprising enter the corridors of political tugging and differences, regardless of our struggle oriented need of it? 

Since the Palestinian citizen does not have answers to all the questions that we have presented and the Palestinian political thought did not provide answers and meaningful conclusions to the earlier uprisings, the logic of things say explicitly that it is not enough to launch slogans and songs of war and to create a combat atmosphere even though we need those slogans and songs because of their true implications, but the uprising need components, conditions, climates, work programs and uniform struggle tools. The Arabs said once before (look firmly at your target before you shot), thus before this and that unifying the will of the Palestinians is required, because division is losing its compass at the time when the Palestinian body is no longer able to tolerate further surgery. 

We as Palestinians should not fight struggles that could fail and have no guaranteed results. We are no longer able to tolerate new setbacks under Arab, regional and to some extent international confusing conditions. There is no doubt that history is opening its arms always to embrace the will of the people to change, whether regarding the regimes of governance or the patterns of struggle, but the people have to know how to play the game of the conflict and to own the elements of victory. 

Our people are in need of successes and gains even if they were small, they would grow and accumulate to make a great and historical victory through the way of our political freedom so that to reach a new resisting unified strategy that employs all the elements, components, and the potentials of the power of the Palestinian people, including imposing concrete reviews of the schemes of the fascist government of the occupation. 

The strategy of the speeches, messages and spreading the complaints of the sponsor, the quad, or the Arab troika and its following-up Committee, is no longer offering any good to the Palestinians, because the school of the Palestinian struggle says clearly that there is no other choice in front of it, but only to stick to the approach of imposing facts strongly and with the right of force, and this is significant in the struggle of the freedom-loving people all around the world, and here all the options are open and all the forms and patterns of struggle are required in a third Intifada or in other one.