Dissimilarities between Iran and the GCC Countries

Yet, what is new in these relations, after the “Arab Spring revolutions”, is that these revolutions have created new strategic variables that could generate kind of the “Competitive Conflict” between Iran and the Gulf countries, because we cannot describe what is happening between the two sides now as a “conflict” in the traditional sense of the word, which often takes the form of the zero equation, and takes a solid pattern that lacks any form of political flexibility. Hence, this does not apply to the reality of the Gulf-Iranian relations, which were witnessing in the most periods of escalation and tension other indicators of cooperation and convergence. 

The term “competence” probably has positive connotations that also do not apply to the path of the Gulf-Iranian relations at the moment when they were witnessing re-production of the atmosphere of the stage of exporting the revolution in the eighties. 

From here, the term which is perhaps the closest to describe the current scene in the relations between Iran and the Gulf countries is a “Competitive Conflict”, which is in reality one degree of the degrees of a conflict, or a pattern of its patterns, with a special and distinctive nature, that holds degrees or levels of the political flexibility. 

The motives of the “conflict” between Iran and the Gulf countries: 
On the Iranian side, we can monitor some of the factors that explain the case of the “conflict” with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries, which are entirety factors associated with the repercussions of the stage after the “Arab Spring”, and the regional environment posed by those resolutions. Iran has faced a regional environment that showed a degree less than the smoothness of submission. 

Its revolutionary message became weak and has been overtaken by the events, and the widespread regional instability did not expand Iran’s power and influence, but Tehran found itself acting in response to the events, rather than directing them, and its dream to materialize an “Islamic Middle East” in the region on the ruins of the regimes that fell did not come true. 

The most important challenge excreted by this environment for Iran is the potentials of the loss of Syria’s ally, and what this could impose of tough examinations on Iran, and its influence in the region, since this is directly linked to its relations with groups, upon which it relied to expand the circles of its regional influence, the most important of course were Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine. 

In front of the incomes of this regional environment, Iran worked to find alternatives to maintain its regional influence, the most important in the Gulf region, and the vital field of its national security, as well as to find a bulwark in the face of all the attempts made by its opponents to penetrate it from the inside, or to tighten the siege imposed on it via the neighboring countries. It followed in this regard several tools that caused its state of “conflict” with the Gulf countries, as we will be clarifying. It also tended to strengthen its influence in other circles outside the Gulf region, where its influence intersects with the Gulf influence, especially Saudi Arabia. 

As for the Gulf, there are factors that also explain why the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) thrust aside their normal diplomatic tone towards Iran, and on top of these factors comes Iran’s attempts to become bigger in the Gulf region that began seriously with the events of the Kingdom of Bahrain in early 2011, and Iran’s attempts to push forward towards dropping the Sunni monarchy, and replacing it with a regime similar to the “Vilayat al-Faqih” one, as a gateway to impose radical changes on the map and the balances of power in the Gulf region. And then, the estimate of the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council for the crisis in Bahrain exceeded just characterizing the crisis as an internal one between the ruling regime and the opposition, but it has been seen as a regional challenge affecting all the countries of the Council. 

Hence, the decision to enter the Peninsula Shield forces into Bahrain was taken. Also, the Iranian expansion in the region took another dimension that was shown in the recent period i.e. the Iranian spying role on the Gulf Countries, which included almost all the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar) during the past two years. 

The new variables which imposed themselves on the equation of the security of the Countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) after the “Arab Spring” act as other factors, and this made them in direct confrontation with Iran, most notably two variables, the first: an indoor variable related to the sources of internal threat that imposed themselves, especially after the increased probabilities regarding the fact that the equations of governance and politics were affected in the six Gulf countries in what takes place of the surrounding changes, what weakened the talk about the “Gulf privacy”, the “Gulf exception”, or the “Arab monarchies’ immunity” much. 

The Gulf countries consider Iran as one of the main factors feeding this type of threat, based on its role in the events witnessed by the Kingdom of Bahrain, and that are still continuing so far through its attempt to thwart the national ongoing dialogue, as well as its role in escalating the case of mobility in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. 

The second variable is an external one that is linked to the inability of the Gulf countries to rely on the “imported security” as a counterweight to the power of Iran in the region, especially in light of several accounts, including the potential of the fact that the Gulf region and the Middle East in general are no more the priorities of the administration of Barack Obama, in its second term, as revealed by the document of America, which was published last year 2012, and which referred that the priority of America was transformed from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific Basin, and this was the salient point contained in it, including also the decline of the niche of the Gulf oil in the eyes of the United States in light of its tireless efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in the energy sources, especially after its successful experience in the development of productive capacities of oil and shale gas. In fact, this is a unique experience that is expected to reshape the global energy map, especially if its scope expanded to reach other areas of the world. 

These calculations indicate that the Gulf countries can no longer rely on the U.S. ally to confront Iran, but now have to manage the “conflict” with it directly, as revealed by the intervention of the Peninsula Shield forces in Bahrain. 

The spaces of dissimilarity between Iran and the Gulf Countries: 
In addition to the Gulf traditional circle, of which Bahrain is its major axis, the circles of dissimilarity between Iran and the Gulf states extends to reach to Yemen, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In Yemen, the Gulf countries worked from the outset to contain the protests, and not to turn them into a comprehensive revolution, and the Gulf initiative came to achieve a gradual ending to the rule of Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime. 

The Gulf countries have made, particularly Saudi Arabia, great efforts to implement the benefits of the initiative in the first and second phases, to reach to the ongoing national dialogue. But Iran on the other side was fueling instability in Yemen, through providing support for the Houthis, and was training numbers of them in the neighboring State of Eritrea, as indicated by the reports on December 20, 2012. It was also providing support for the advocates of secession in the south, according to what was announced by the head of Yemeni national security on 8 January 2013, was sending several Iranian shipments of weapons that were smuggled into Yemen, and was trying to thwart the ongoing national dialogue. 

As for Egypt, it has become one of the most important circles of the “competitive conflict” between Iran and the Gulf countries; Egypt is trying to develop its relations in Cairo, taking advantage of the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power, and of some positive signals it has been receiving in this regard since the January 25 revolution. 

As for the Gulf countries, they put their pressure with all available means - the political and economic ones- on the opposite contrary direction. It could be said that the Gulf situation - in addition to the internal opposition, especially by the Salafist groups in Egypt - is considered one of the most important factors of the undeveloped Egyptian - Iranian relations, as desired by Tehran. 

Regarding Syria, it has been turned into a “Square of proxy war” on the international level and at the regional level between Iran and the Gulf Arab countries. Iran is sparing no effort to prevent the fall of the Assad regime, and the Gulf countries in return are now agreeing on the goal of overthrowing the regime, and arming the opposition, but they differ among themselves on the Syrian groups that should be supported. 

Qatar is supporting the Syrian opposition faction, which is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, and does not show a reluctance to support the jihadist groups in Syria at this stage. 

As for Saudi Arabia, which fears the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region, has reservation regarding providing support for the Syrian Brotherhood. 

Iraq in turn has become an open arena for the Iranian influence, since the withdrawal of the U.S. troops, what created a security vacuum and Iran has sought to fill it. This comes despite the fact that the Gulf countries are trying to restore Iraq back to its Arab circular, either through the re-opening of embassies, or through the termination of certain chronic disputes such as those between Iraq and Kuwait, which have witnessed significant positive developments in the recent period. 

The success of Iran in establishing links with the Shiite parties and groups opened several fields to extend the Iranian influence in Iraq, as expressed by the leader of the “Iraqi List” and the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Iyad Allawi, on March 5, 2013 when he said that “Iran has become the force dominating the joints of the State in Iraq”, and this has enabled Tehran to intensify its support to the government of Nouri al-Maliki in the face of the growing protest movement in the country against the government’s policies, especially in the Sunni provinces, west of the country. 

How are the Gulf countries managing the “conflict” with Iran? 

The Gulf Countries have taken, during the recent period, a number of steps to be able to manage the “competitive conflict” with Iran, and they were primarily focusing on the attempt to strengthen the links between the Gulf countries. Hence, the Saudi initiative was launched to move from the stage of cooperation to the stage of union during the summit, No. 32 in Riyadh (December 2011), and this step was justified by the Saudi monarch by saying that “the security of the GCC countries is targeted" without mentioning Iran by name. 

Those countries also tended towards the development of the Gulf self power to counterbalance the power of Iran, as expressed by the resolution of the thirty third summit, which was held in Bahrain on December 2012, through the establishment of a unified Gulf military command in charge of coordinating, planning and leading the Navy and Air forces belonging to the six GCC countries, and of conducting military exercises with the Peninsula Shield forces, most recently was Exercise No. 9, which took place in Kuwait during the period from 10 to 26 February 2013 with the participation of ground, navy, and air forces from the GCC. 

In general, these tools have limited value and efficiency in the management of the “conflict” with Iran, for the Gulf Union project is still locked in drawers, and the points of disagreement on it are more than the points of agreement. 

In fact, the last steps for the establishment of a unified Gulf military command, and making some common military exercises, do not change anything from the truth that the Peninsula Shield forces have a “symbolic” role primarily, and do not have the ability to achieve any deterrence in the face of Iran, or to repel any foreign aggression. 

Most of all, when we are talking about a “conflict” , or a “competition”, between Iran and the GCC countries, we mention the term “GCC” metaphorically, because realistically - when it comes to Iran specifically - we cannot talk about the GCC countries as a bloc, because there is a very complex problem in the Gulf political perception - and the Arabic one in general - regarding Iran, and this is expressed by Dr. Mohammed Saeed Idris accurately in his study entitled “Iran is a strategic ally within objective conditions”. 

In which he explained that “As far as we can deal with Iran as a definite or potential source of threat to the Gulf countries, it also remains to be a partner culturally, politically and geographically, and even culturally. Exception remains limited in the political perception that believes that Iran is a full source of threat, and cannot be an ally, or the one that believes that Iran is an ally, absolutely, and cannot be a source of threat. 

This problematic can be interpreted in the light of two main factors: First, Iran’s clash with the Gulf countries regarding variety of contentious issues that prevent a specific recognition of Iran, and impose confusion in adhering to such a perception. 

The second factor is related to the Iranian politics, which tend to blend between what could be considered a threat and what can be viewed as cooperative policies”. 

Therefore, it is difficult to talk about a Gulf perception and an Iranian one, but we can talk about Gulf multiple, different, and sometimes contradictory perceptions regarding Iran that could be stretched between the maximum enmity and the maximum amity, according to the model formulated by Barry Buzan, who talked about the “enmity-amity” axis that is similar to the incorporation of the colors of the rainbow, as talked about by both Kantory and Spiegel, describing it as “The Spectrum of Relations”. 

It could be said that Iran relies on this discrepancy in the Gulf perception regarding it, in order to maintain the “ball rolling” in the most strained periods in its relations with the Gulf States. Therefore, despite the multiplicity of the factors and circles of the “conflict” between Iran and the Gulf States, the case could unlikely evolve to reach to an uncalculated escalation between the two sides, but it will continue to be confined within the framework of what might be called a “Flexible conflict”, which allows degrees of flexibility that enable both sides not to turn this conflict into an “open confrontation” between them.