US’ involvement in Syria’ Sarin gas attack

The results of their analysis confirmed that the gas used did not match the substances known to exist in the Syrian army’s chemical weapons arsenal.

Contrary to the official US stance, which claimed that Assad’s forces were the only party with the capability to launch sarin attacks, intelligence circles in Britain and the US became aware that rebel units in Syria such as the Al-Nusra Front had been developing chemical weapons since the spring of 2013.

Hersh claims that analysts from the US Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) were already aware by June 2013 that Al-Nusra Front’s sarin production unit was “the most advanced sarin plot since Al-Qaeda’s pre-9/11 effort,” and that Turkey and Saudi-based chemical facilitators were attempting to purchase sarin chemical precursors in bulk for anticipated production efforts inside Syria.

A source formerly high-level within the Defence Department told Hersh that White House Chief of Staff Denis McDonough ordered the publishing of intelligence pertaining to chemical weapons be blacked-out and restricted in the DIA’s daily briefs on Syria following small-scale sarin attacks in March and April. Carla Del Ponte, the UN inspector who investigated the earlier attacks, would later claim that evidence she compiled suggested that rebels had used the weapons.

Hersh’s sources claim that members of the Syrian opposition in exile became frustrated how earlier Western intelligence assessments failed to conclude that sarin had been used, keeping Obama’s ‘red line’ technically intact. Following the events of August 21, the Syrian opposition claimed that sarin had been used before any analysis had taken place, while the White House backed the claim, endorsing it from the outset.

Hersh’s sources also claim that US intelligence officials were aware since spring of 2013 that the Turkish government and its intelligence services were working directly with Al-Nusra Front and its allies to develop a chemical warfare capability. Turkey’s Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdoğan, who adopted a strong position against Damascus from the onset of the conflict, was said to be highly frustrated by the rebels losing ground against Syrian government forces and felt that intervention served as the only reliable route to neutralize Assad. Hersh cited a former US intelligence official in his report who told him, “We knew there were some in the Turkish government who believed they could get Assad’s nuts in a vice by dabbling with a sarin attack inside Syria – and forcing Obama to make good on his ‘red line’ threat.”

‘Monster strike’ averted

Hersh’s report reveals how the question of enforcing Obama’s ‘red line’ polarized the US establishment. On the one side, figures in the White House were committed to military intervention despite probably being aware that Turkish intelligence played a role in engineering the August 21 attack that crossed the ‘red line’. On the other, Pentagon officials who felt that the evidence to support claims of Assad’s complicity were weak and that military strikes would be a disastrous shortcut to a wider regional war. The latter’s advice was ultimately heeded by President Obama, who likely felt that the costs of intervention would ultimately undermine his position and create disastrous political consequences that would necessitate a greater US military commitment.

In the face of too many unknowns, Obama looked for a way to backpedal out of his vow to strike Syria militarily, which culminated in his calls for congressional approval and the subsequent endorsement of the UN-backed disarmament plan. Although Obama backed off military intervention for purely pragmatic reasons, Hersh’s exposé details how the administration was willing to target military and civilian infrastructure, and enact airstrikes that would have incurred significant civilian causalities – all to ‘punish’ Assad and topple his government.

The White House allegedly dismissed the Pentagon’s initial suggestions of airstrike targets over concerns that their plans would be insufficiently “painful” to Syrian forces, and pressured the Pentagon to revise their list of targets, creating what a former intelligence official called “a monster strike” scenario. The attack plans called for two wings of B-52 bombers, navy submarines and ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles to target electric power grids, oil and gas depots, all known logistic and weapons depots, all known command and control facilities, and all known military and intelligence buildings.

The governments of Britain and France were enthusiastic and deeply committed to taking part in the planned American air war. Hersh’s sources claim that General Martin Dempsey, the officer charged with planning and executing the proposed Syria strikes, reacted sceptically toward the administration’s claims that Assad used chemical armaments and called for more evidence. Dempsey allegedly believed that Assad was winning the war and wouldn’t have used sarin at that stage of the conflict, and repeatedly warned Congress of the dangers of militarily intervening in Syria.

Hersh claims that the initial tests on sarin samples conducted by British intelligence, which vindicated Assad, influenced the US Joint Chiefs of Staff to persuade Obama into cancelling the strikes, which would have ultimately been considered an unjustified act of aggression.