Mohamed Morsi and the questions of the national sharing…

This scene has settled after facing for one and a half years a popular uprising to choose the “Muslim Brotherhood” for the presidency after an electoral race full of risks and surprises and after the “military” blew the whistle of its end without being shackled with the causes of the conflict that are likely to serve as a justification for the fabrication of the problems and differences. What was meant here is that the “Military Council” wanted to issue a “complementary constitutional declaration” that could restore its legislative power before announcing the results of the presidential election and after the Constitutional Court ruled to dissolve the parliament. This gives it the power to control the reconfiguration of the Constitution Committee that is expected to be resolved by a judicial decision, and limits the powers of the President of the Republic in many fields. On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood took the initiative to control the street and the squares, despite winning the position of the presidency, and this indicates that both parties are trying to evoke the papers of their strength drawing as it seems on two main rules.

The first is that the Islamic political movement in order to be able to have the chance to control the joints of the Egyptian state after winning the chair has to control the institution of the army, the security services, and the police, being the most important joints of power in any country. However, when it comes to the Egyptian state led by the army since the revolution of July/1952 and taking over its administration formally since contributing to the removing of its former president, we should highlight the details due to their utmost importance, and perhaps this explains the sit-in conducted by the “Muslim Brotherhood” group at the Tahrir Squares. Yet, the most prominent question here: did their sit-in take place just to complete the achievement of the demands of the popular uprising? Or, is it a case of utilizing this to use it in the face of and when fighting the “junta” in order to control all the aspects of the state and its powers? This comes especially that this desire is sweeping some of the militant parties and blocs in the Islamic movements, according to some informed sources.

The second rule is about the weight, size and influence of the “Brotherhood” in the Egyptian street, for some observers believe that Mohamed Morsi won with less than a quarter of the votes of the voters who are registered in the records in the elections that were boycotted by half of them as an expression of rejection of both the run-off candidates. They also believe that half of the voters voted for him not to support his program, but as an expression of their rejection of the program of his rival, Ahmed Shafiq, who had a close ratio with him. Thus, the total of the votes obtained by the other candidates in the elections of the first round came close to the total of the votes obtained by the two candidates who competed in the run-off.

This means that a qualitative development has occurred in the balance of power in the political and civil Egyptian community in comparison with its status when the parliamentary elections took place a few months ago. Therefore, the Islamic movements, despite winning the presidency, are facing the challenge of stopping the style of the “transcendent” majority and going to the people and to their live forces by acts and work and not by words and theories. They have also to pursue a policy of national coalitions to convince the rest of the forces to cooperate and participate with them on the basis of the joint commons. Hence, are they going to adopt this to embody the facts of the balance of power on the ground, or they are going to adopt tactics and political maneuvers designed to reap the fruits of the uprising autocratically?

In fact, the Egyptian political scene can be read and analyzed in different ways after the Islamists took power, but it seems that these readings and analyzes revolve in the orbit of the aforementioned rules, and their importance is in how the “Muslim Brotherhood” would deal with them in a practical way rather than in a theoretical way, and this will affect in one way or another in the preparation for and the formation of the general national climate, which would contribute to solving the contradictions and interior conflicts. This would also draw a new “road map” in how to deal with the foreign interferences, including the interference of the United States aiming at keeping Egypt attached to and belonging to its policy, and committed to the Camp David Convention with the Israeli entity.

What is required of course is to ensure Israel’s superiority over the other countries in the region, particularly Egypt, for it is the largest Arab country and the most and the best able to draw the region’s politics. Therefore, if President Mohamed Morsi chosen the option of continuing the policy of the majority, whether with the rest of the political forces, or with the “military”, this would extend the term of the internal contradictions and would prolong its implications, what would obliges him directly or indirectly, to “equivocate” his positions so that not to collide with the international and regional vision of the United States which did not collide with him when he took the presidency. This comes especially since he is the winner by less than a quarter of the votes of the voters who are registered on the electoral register, not to mention the power cards that are still with the “Military Council”, so Dr. Mohamed Morsi would be unable to extract them but only through understanding and complying with them.

However, if he chose the option of the policy of sharing with the “Military Council” and the rest of the political forces, this would ease the internal contradictions and shorten the duration of their implications, what contributes to the reunification of the Egyptian National Front , and increases his vaccination to be guarded against any foreign interventions, and this would enable Egypt as a State and Republic to be advanced again to regain its role and status that worth its importance and weight internationally, regionally and at the Arab level. As well as, the policy of national sharing gives more of the ability to double the sincere efforts and pushes towards activating the energies and assembling the various national forces. Without this, with no doubt, no other party, no matter how its political strength and experience was, can alone be able to overcome the challenges of the political, economic and social inherit that was a heavy burden faced by the people and the nation for three decades of the monopoly of power, which led to the uprising of the Egyptian people against it by millions of people who were demanding freedom, social justice, and human and national dignity.