The rise of the Houthis in Yemen – Global movement

If the Houthis, a formerly obscure band of tribal fighters, could be sneered at back in 2009, shrugged off as Shia wannabe rebels by Yemen’s high and mighty, 2011 uprising levelled the political field to such an extent that the Houthis have come out of the revolutionary storm, a new shiny penny.

Three years after the Arab Spring the Houthis have come to challenge the state in a manner which remains unprecedented. Their advances to the very edges of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, their broad political appeal and their ability to command mass popular support has made this one faction, one of Yemen’s new political heavy weight. But beyond the rise of what will probably be remembered as the country’s new political giant, exists a raw political power which could change not only the face of Yemen but redefine the region’s political and diplomatic fault-lines. It is important to understand that as the house of Al Houthi rises, it is the coming of Shia political Islam which this impoverished nation of the Arabian Peninsula will witness.

To better comprehend recent developments in Yemen, one needs to go back in time, back when the Houthis were not yet enemies of the state; back when Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabis did not yet lay their claims on Yemen’s political landscape, back in 1994.

How the Houthis came to be

Back in 1994, the Houthis actually did not exist. Since the state had not yet chosen to target Yemen’s northern Zaidi population, no tribal leader or cleric felt the need to assert Zaidis’ rights to existence. Yemen’s northern alliance as one might call it was to be upset by South Yemen’s bid for independence and former President Saleh’ subsequent need for military backup.  

While until 1994, Sheikh Hussein Badr Eddin Al-Houthi, the founder of the Houthi,  a then-member of parliament for Al Haqq Islamic party enjoyed a rather privileged relationship with former President Saleh, the latter’s need to broker an alliance with Riyadh to safeguard his presidency against South Yemen’s independence claims, would drive a wedge which would echo through the next decades. Fearful of Yemen’s Zaidis’ political ambition and a potential alliance with Shia Iran, Riyadh encouraged former President Saleh to politically isolate and tarnish men like Al Houthi in exchange for unlimited political and military backup. The deal also included the introduction of Saudi Arabia’s own religious doctrine to Yemen – Wahhabism.

To preserve Yemen’s unity President Saleh sold out the highlands to Saudi Arabia.
As Sunni ultra-orthodox began to expand their zones of influence in northern Yemen, Sheikh Al Houthi rose in protest, determined to reclaim what he felt was Yemen’s religious heritage and identity – the rest is history.

Fast forward two decades and a revolution, the Houthis have successfully built a mountain on the ashes of the former regime. With Yemen’s two powerhouses standing on quick sand – the General People’s Congress and Al Islah – the Houthis have exponentially gained in strength and numbers, feeding from their adversaries lagging and lacking, revelling in the ever-expanding power vacuum left by President Saleh’s departure.

A new alliance

When President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi found himself propelled to the presidency in 2012, he quickly realise that for his mandate to be meaningful and lasting he would have to find a way to counter-act Islamists’ influence within his government. The old power-play which former President Saleh has set in place had all but crumbled to the ground and Al Islah was getting ready to claim complete and utter control over the state’s institutions, including the military. 

Caught in between Al Harak’ secessionist claims in the south, the threat of Al Qaeda and the overbearing weight of Al Islah, President Hadi found an unlikely, yet very potent ally in the Houthis.

Even though this is seldom covered by the media, the Houthis enabled President Hadi to assert his presidency over the republic by eliminating and eroding at those very powers the president could not openly oppose, let alone attack.

A powerful proxy, the Houthis have done what President Hadi could not and would certainly not admit to – they declared war on Yemen’s Islamists.

Let us remember that just as the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt in 2012, Yemen’s Islamists hoped the ouster of former President Saleh would allow them to rule unchallenged over the republic. But the Houthis were waiting. Following over a decade of oppression by the hands of Yemen’ Salafis and Wahhabis, the Houthis vowed to reclaim the highlands and defeat Sunni radicals. If Al Islah, which accounts within its ranks controversial figures, such as Sheikh Abdel-Mageed Al Zindani, a cleric who has figured on America’s most wanted terror list since 2004, has benefited since 1994 from the protection of Saudi Arabia after the kingdom chose to use the faction as a counter-power to former President Saleh; the rising threat of Al Qaeda forced Riyadh to reassess its policy and renege on its former protégés.

With Saudi Arabia on board, President Hadi began cleansing the impoverished nation from its Islamists. 

Walking with the Houthis

The march of the Houthis began late last October 2013 in Dammaj, a city located in the northern province of Sa’ada. Dammaj became ground zero for what would grow to be the War of the Houthis. 

Intent on curtailing Islamists’ hegemonic ambitions in northern Yemen, the Houthis decided to act instead of the state, having understood that politics and military allegiances had paralyzed the armed forces to the extent where generals served not their country but rather tribal leaders and political factions. If former President Saleh shaped the army to remain loyal to his command by nominating trusted aids and family members to key strategic position during his 30 years in power, so did Al Islah. 

It is crucial to understand that whenever the Houthis have battled the military, it is not the state they fought, but rather Islahi commanders, which is why President Hadi chose to remain a silent witness. 

Looking back, the Houthis were quite clearly allowed to advance against Al Islah. Otherwise why would President have tolerated Houthi militants to set up base on the very edge of his capital, in a province, Amran, which used to be under the control of Al Islah’s most prominent tribal family, Al Ahmar? The loss of Amran has meant that Al Islah’s military man, Gen. Ali Mohsen Al Ahmar, Yemen’s former most powerful military man has had his legs cut off from under him.

In only a few weeks the Houthis succeeded where President Hadi had previously failed - they dismantled Al Islah military network.

While from President Hadi’s perspective the Houthis have proven to be useful allies, especially since they allowed him to retain political deniability, Yemen’s president now fears that the giant he unleashed could soon develop ambitions of its own. 

An astute politician and very much his father’ son, Abdel-Malek Al Houthi remembers the taste of betrayal too well not to want to assert his new-found power in a manner which will undoubtedly clash with President Hadi’s interests.

But as Yemen’s new players are testing their political reach and defining power dynamics, remains an opportunity to bridge some of the political and ideological fault-lines which have plagued the region since 1979. Yemen Zaidis could open up new avenues in between Iran and Saudi Arabia, acting a catalyst for if not reconciliation, cohabitation.